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ABSTRACT 
 
ECONOMETRIC STUDY ON THE IMPACTS OF PRIVATIZATION, NEW 
ENTRY, AND INDEPENDENT REGULATOR ON MOBILE PENETRATION 
AND EXPANSION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
SHIVA ESHGHOLLAHI 
 
Economics, M.A. Thesis, July 2018 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Assoc .Prof. İzak Atiyas 
 
In this study, we analyze the effect of telecommunication reform variables 
(privatization, competition and Independent regulator) on mobile penetration using a 
panel dataset of 46 developing countries, which covers the period 1995-2016. Using 
fixed effect model to estimate the correlation between reform variables and our 
dependent variable we find positive and statistically significant correlation between 
competition level and mobile penetration rate. The results also suggest that 
privatization per se is associated with increase in the mobile cellular subscriptions per 
100 people. The results indicate that while existence of an independent regulator a long 
with privatization increase the mobile penetration, presence of independent regulator 
although positive but not significantly correlated with mobile penetration.  
 
Keywords: Telecommunication, Privatization, Competition, Independent Regulator, 
Mobile Penetration 
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ÖZET 
 
GELİŞMEKTE OLAN ÜLKELERDE ÖZELLEŞTİRME, YENİ GİRİŞ VE 
BAĞIMSIZ DÜZENLEYİCİNİN MOBİL  PENETRASYON VE GELİŞİMİ 
ÜZERİNE ETKİLERİNE DAİR EKONOMETRİK ÇALIŞMA 
 
SHIVA ESHGHOLLAHI 
 
Ekonomi,Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2018 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç .Dr. İzak Atiyas 
 
Bu çalışma telekomünikasyon reformu değişkenlerinin (özelleştirme, rekabet ve 
bağımsız düzenleyici) mobil  penetrasyon üzerine olan etkilerini, gelişmekte olan 46 
ülkeyi ve 1995-2016 yıllarını  kapsayan bir panel veri seti kullanarak analiz etmektedir. 
Reform değişkenleri ve söz konusu bağımlı değişken arasındaki korelasyonu tahmin 
etmek için sabit etkiler modeli  kullanarak   rekabet düzeyi  ve mobil  penetrasyon oranı 
arasında pozitif ve istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir ilişki tespit edilmiştir.  
Ayrıca  sonuçlara göre tek  başına özelleştirme   her 100 kişi için mobil   cihaz aboneliği 
sayısında bir artışla ilişkilendirilmektedir. Sonuçlar bağımsız bir düzenleyicinin 
mevcudiyetinin özelleştirme ile beraber mobil penetrasyonu  artırdığını gösterirken, 
bağımsız düzenleyicinin mevcudiyeti ve mobil penetrasyon arasındaki korelasyonun 
pozitif ancak anlamsız olduğunu göstermektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Telekomünikasyon, Özelleştirme, Rekabet, Bağımsız 
Düzenleyici, Mobil Penetrasyon 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
elecommunications condition in developing countries is different from 
industrial countries in terms of structure, system quality, limitations and the 
speed of growth. Therefore assessment of telecommunication reforms in 
developed countries differs from their developing counterparts, although they were 
exposed to similar reforms. This paper focuses on the mobile network market in 
developing countries. First, because mobile network sector is now the most dynamic 
sector in telecoms in the world and also by its progressing technology it is a strong 
substitute for fixed lines. According to the ITU statistics (2016) the global fixed-line 
markets have shown recession by decreasing world average fixed-line penetration rate 
which was nearly at 20% since 2005 at its highest level and it reached to 13.4% in 
2016, despite that the global mobile markets remain actively growing. World average 
mobile penetration rate in 2016 received to its highest level 100.6%, therefore, 
presently, the mobile market is better able to capture the dynamics of the telecom sector 
around the world.  
In this study we conduct an econometric analysis to examine impact of 
privatization, level of competition and regulation of mobile sector on the network 
expansion in developing countries. Our data set includes an original panel dataset of 
46 countries in Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, sub Saharan Africa and 
East Asia spanning 1995-2016.  
Using a fixed effect models we find that stablishing separate regulator, 
privatization of incumbent and liberalization of the mobile network providers’ is 
positively correlated with mobile deployment. Additionally the result indicates the 
positive effect of regulation while privatization is happening and competition shows 
the most effective factor of reforms on mobile penetration. Lastly, we use dynamic 
model, to detect the short-run effect of reform variables on growth of mobile 
penetration the results identify positive but not significant effect of establishing 
separate regulator, competition and privatization.  
 
 
T 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
he telecommunication reform start in era which Noll (1999) called it 
neoliberal reform era and before that, telecom was considered as a natural 
monopoly. This approach asserts that, minimum prices can be provided by 
a single company. As a result, telecommunication infrastructure in most of the 
developing countries stablished and expanded under control of government owned 
telecom companies where it caused ineffective and expensive services. Wallsten 
(2000). The reforms in 70’s and 80’s had two vital causes.  The first one was the 
economic crises in the 1970s and 1980s that challenge many developing countries, 
reform was a solution to their debt crisis to decrease their debt and poor financial 
performance, and it also brought capital inflow for governments that could be used to 
stabilize macroeconomics variables in the country. 
Second reason for privatization was dissatisfaction with the state-owned services 
like, poor service quality, low state-owned services quality, low productivity, and long 
waiting times for obtaining services (Ros, 1999). As countries introduced competition, 
particularly in the mobile telecommunications sector, they started to shift from 
monopoly supply approach, which was working over three-quarters of the last century 
and dominated the world’s telecommunications markets, to competitive supply 
approach. It was obvious that nationalized monopoly telecommunications firms in 
developing countries suffered from serious issues, particularly low investment level. 
These problems were mainly due to governments’ manipulation in telecommunication 
markets and the suboptimal tariffs imposed by them. The low tariffs in most of cases 
were not attractive enough to absorb necessary investment in response to growing 
demand for the telecommunication services (Kessides, 2004 ).  
Given the background telecommunication reforms in developing countries 
initiated with perspective of a positive-sum game in which all the players in society 
will benefit from it. Assumptions of these reforms are that government by 
implementing various policies and considering market imperfections can legitimate 
liberalization and promote competition (Noll, 1999). 
T 
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In the existing literature, telecommunication reforms investigated mainly from 
three aspects: first, ownership structure of incumbent firm and transition process that 
imposed to it, second introducing competition and competition level in the market, 
third, considering telecommunication industry structure establishing an independent 
industry regulator which regulate telecommunication market just based on market 
necessities.  
Wallsten (2001) argues that in developing countries due to various reasons each 
part of the reforms can be realized in different ways. For instance, in most of the cases 
privatization is not perfect and it was conducted in a defective way. The government 
most of the time initially hold partial ownership of the incumbent, they also may 
constrain competition temporary in order to attract new investors. Likewise, regulator 
performs in such a way that can have large and uncontrolled influence on the 
performance of the telecommunication sector.  
Levy and Spiller (1994) adds that, given the background and institutional 
structure of countries, reliability and efficiency of telecommunication sector also the 
effectiveness of reforms can variate. Where, in most of developing countries these 
institutional differences along with (usual) political and economic instability affecting 
the telecommunication reforms variables (privatization, competition and regulatory) 
such that it may completely alter the reforms expected results from what we plan and 
anticipate.  
 
2.1. Effect of Privatization, Competition, and Separate Regulator 
Changing the inculmbent ownership from public to private necessarily won’t  result in 
network expansion, for instance in a state-owned company the demand for network 
may be higher as a result of inefficiency in price setting and prices set by government 
may be lower costs and this cause excessive increase in the demand. The expectation 
is that after privatization, productivity of labor and allocation of sources improve. The 
logic for this assumtion comes from the idea that privatization transfers control power 
both for human and financial sources to private owners. However, private firms are 
also confronted with government intervention often times though it is less possible than 
their public counter parts. This can be due to the point that generally privetization 
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increase the cost of intervention in decision making process of privet companies for 
governemnts.  
Privetization also can benefetial through increasing total factor productivity of 
state owned firms. As Vickers and Yarrow (1998) argue, that managers of public 
enterprises face less incentive to cut the extra costs since they cannot directly benefit 
from cutting the expences Because of incentives for impelemnting innovative cost 
controlling ways, we expect to have higher total factor productivity after privatization 
of the telecommunications sector. 
According to the theory of monopoly market when one firm is able to fulfill total 
industry demand at lower cost it is more beneficial to have one big company rather 
than number of companies, on the other hand, establishment of a sustainable natural 
monopoly is not always possible, in this case, competition may have positive effect on  
main line network expansion. (Ros, 1999).  In Telecommunication reforms literature 
many scholars and articles admit that introduction of competition in the telecom sector 
has been beneficial especially in terms of access to the services (GASMI, 
MAINGARD, & NOUMBA, 2012).  
In evaluating the effect of telecommunication privatization, according to 
Ros(1999) prosperity level of privatization can depend on regulatory structure which 
is influenced by political and institutional position of conutries. Similarly Spiller 
(1995) emphasized on the effect of adequate regulatory system and asserts that most 
of the time two major reasons stop countries from having a competent regulatory 
system, firstly lack of constitutional protection against administrative expropriation. 
Second neglecting the fact that all sophisticated theoretical regulatory frameworks do 
not work for all countries and they should design their own convenient method which 
suits the country’s structure.  
 
2.2. Econometric Studies and Endogeneity Problem 
To investigate the effect of telecommunication reforms some of the researchers 
conduct econometric analyses. In this section we will look at some of those studies in 
more details. Ros (1999) studied the effects of privatization and competition on fixed-
line network expansion and efficiency in a sample of 110 countries during 1986-1995 
time period. Using a fixed-effects model he found that private ownership of 
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telecommunication provider, was positively correlated with main lines per 100 
inhabitants’ variable, but competition, not found to have effect on network fixed-line 
expansion. Ros sample was mixture of 110 developed and developing countries, which 
can generate a lot of heterogeneity and possibly bias the results. He tried to solve this 
problem by separating the studied countries to countries with GDP per capita below 
and above $10,000.  
It is important to note that decision of the telecom sector start privatization, may 
not be an exogenous decision, it can be the case that countries with worse financial 
position are more likely to privatize. Reforms affect dependent variable, telecom 
performance, but performance may also affect reforms. In addition unobserved factors 
affecting reform may also affect performance. Therefore, studying the effect of 
regulation and privatization on dependent variable under the assumption of reform 
variables are exogenous, is problematic. 
Ros(1999) deal with endogeneity problem by estimating two logit models where 
the dependent variable is competition or privatization and explanatory variables are 
network expansion, efficiency, GDP per capita lagged one year, Investment per line 
lagged one year, by using the logit model, he first model the decision to privatize or 
permission of competition as a discrete choice. In the logit model, regressors are 
exogenous, then he will use the predicted probabilities interacted with the observed 
dummy variables as instrument in the second estimation processes. However beside 
this try to solve the issue the result does not vary too much from the model with 
exogenous assumption.  
Wallsten(2001) in variant study by using Fixed-effects regressions, analyses the 
effect privatization, competition, and regulation of mainlines on performance  in 30 
Latin American and African countries from 1984 through 1997, he found that 
increasing competition increases the per capita number of mainlines, payphones, and 
connection capacity. Privatization interacted with an independent regulator is 
correlated with telecom performance positively. Despite that, Privatization per se, is 
identified with few benefits, and is negatively correlated with network capacity. 
Regulation interacted with competition had no significant impact.  
Wallsten also acknowledged his study weaknesses by highlighting the 
endogeneity problem which we explained earlier, is the possibility that competition, 
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privatization and regulation may be endogenous to reforms. He tried to solve the 
endogeneity problem by including country and year fixed-effects and a variable 
indicating whether the country passed reform legislation. Country fixed-effect control 
for a country-specific tendency and ability to reform, and year fixed effects control for 
general history and flows of changes in telecom service. 
 A paper by Gutierrez (2003) look at the relation between endogenous regulation 
and fixed line telecommunications expansion and efficiency for a sample of 22 Latin 
American countries during the period 1980-1997. His main results showed that 
regulatory governance in telecommunications influence network expansion and 
efficiency positively, in both the static and dynamic specifications. Competition and 
deprivation of former state-owned telecom operators also result in improving sector 
performance. The dynamic specifications showed that previous performance had 
strong effect on present performance. Gutierrez (2003) utilize Panel data techniques to 
conduct the econometric analysis for both static and dynamic models. Additionally, he 
includes time dummies since the data duration is eighteen years, it is acceptable for 
capturing changes in economic and industry environment. He argues that since in the 
period under study, Latin American economic and political situation underwent 
important events, and also telecommunications was subjected to dramatic 
technological changes at the same time, therefore, it seems necessary to for time effect 
along with countries fixed effects. The dependence of the reform variables on past 
achievements is shown by inclusion of lagged values of the endogenous behavioral 
variables where he solves the endogeneity problem by using Arellano and Bond's 
GMM estimator. Lagged dependent variable can explain network expansion and it may 
show the importance of investment. 
Li (2008) study was a different contribution to the telecommunication reform 
literature from earlier papers we have discussed till now, since he analyses impacts of 
privatization, New Entry, and independent industry regulator on mobile network 
penetration and expansion on 30 national mobile markets (i.e. 29 OECD countries and 
China) over the time period 1991-2006, till now all the studies were demonstrating the 
fixed line network deployment but this study is focusing on the mobile market and 
mention the reasons as, first perpetual progress in the wireless network technology and 
second he found mobile network services a powerful substitutes for fixed lines. This 
study is also important regarding it is analyzing more developed countries and the time 
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period is more recent. The study investigate the reform variables relationship by 
employing a structural model  based on logistic growth model, with considering 
potential endogeneity by mobile service price and labor productivity(mobile price and 
labor productivity are two endogenous explanatory variables, means the independent 
regulator(dependent variable) also has impact on labor productivity  and mobile price). 
The estimation result confirms that introducing new entry is positively correlated with 
mobile network penetration and expansion, particularly entry of third mobile operator 
is correlated with the network expansion rapidly. The study also focused on the role of 
independent regulator in a long with the privatization, and found that an independent 
regulator in privatized mobile markets is positively correlated with the network 
expansion on the other hand, privatization per se, on average, negatively correlated 
with mobile network expansion. The results of dynamic model also acknowledge these 
conclusions.  
Generally empirical studies about a developing country is scare however, there 
is some studies about mobile diffusion from emerging and developed economies. 
Gruber (2001) using a logistic fixed-effects model, explores the diffusion of mobiles 
in Central and Eastern Europe, and found positive relationship between  the speed of 
mobile diffusion and  the number of firms, the size of the fixed telecommunications 
network and the length of the waiting list.  
Furthermore, Gruber & Verboven (2000) intent to empirically assess the role of 
technology and regulatory decisions as major determinants in the speed of diffusion of 
mobile telecommunications services in the European Union. This paper Using panel 
data on the whole history of the industry for all 15 member states of the EU, evaluate 
the relative importance of the following factors: technology, the timing of the first 
licenses granted, and the introduction of competition. The impact of the existing fixed 
line network and GDP per capita are also considered. Gruber & Verboven (2000) found 
that timing of the first entry, competition and mode of the second cellular entry are the 
major determinants of the speed of mobile diffusions although the effect of new entry 
was smaller than the technology effect. They also found that income (as measured by 
GDP per capita), main lines, the waiting list and technology have significant positive 
impact on the diffusion of mobiles.   
8 
 
Gebreab (2002) perform an empirical analysis on the determinants of the 
diffusion of mobile telecommunications in Africa by using fixed effects model for 41 
African countries over the time period from 1987-2000. The determinants of mobile 
diffusion that this study has described classify into six main themes, including 
competition, existence of an incumbent-owned cellular, regulation, technological 
change, privatization. The estimation results confirms that competition is the major 
motivation causing the mobile expansion in Africa. Monopoly markets are the slowest 
in the speed of growth in comparison with both tripoly and duopoly markets. 
Additionally the study finds that the presence of an incumbent-owned cellular in 
mobile markets has negative impact on the diffusion of mobiles. This is compatible 
with the theory of an abuse of a dominant position.  Gebreab (2002) did not find, any 
significant evidence to challenges the idea of differences between simultaneous and 
sequential entries.  In sequential competitive entries, the major effect of competition 
on mobile growth appear after the actual year of entry.  
On the other hand Gruber and Verboven (2000) in their global mobile 
communications study, found sequential entry is more effective. The result also 
highlight the positive and significant effect of digitalization, which accelerates the rate 
of mobile diffusion. This finding is consistent with the Gruber and Verboven (2000), 
where they also found positive effect of digitalization in their EU study. Finally, 
urbanization (measured by the percent of urban population) and main lines are positive 
and significant; the positive significance of the main lines variable indicate that 
mobiles are anticipated as complements to fixed lines. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA 
 
ur database is a panel data set contains information of 46 non-OECD 
countries with focus on developing countries in Middle East and North 
Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and East Asia from 1995-2016 
(lists of countries shown in Table I), they are selected based on data availability. This 
point is important since for constructing the countries sample we did not consider their 
telecommunication sector performance. We also exclude countries that facing 
domestic or international war like Syria. 
  
Table 1 
Countries in telecommunications database 
Latin America Sub Saharan Africa MENA Asia 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Bolivia 
Costa Rica 
Colombia 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Guatemala 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Honduras 
El Salvador 
Nicaragua 
Vietnam 
Angola 
Gabon 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Malawi 
Zambia 
Cameroon 
Uganda 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Iran 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Lebanon 
Jordan 
Yemen 
Oman 
Kuwait 
Saudi Arabia 
Sri Lanka 
Malaysia 
Indonesia 
Thailand 
China 
Pakistan 
India 
Bangladesh 
Philippines 
 
The data set covers both group of countries which privatized or not privatized 
their incumbents firms in mobile providers markets, this prevents our analysis from 
having sample selection biases that might happen if only one group (privatized and not 
privatized) of countries used in the sample.  
O 
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Using network deployment (Mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people) as the 
dependent variable, we investigate its relationship with three main dimensions of 
telecommunications reform, where they define as main explanatory variables in our 
models. Information on Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) and existence 
of a separate regulator, come from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
dataset. We collect information about Number of mobile operators in each year for 
each country from mobile operators’ websites.  
The Privatization defines as a dummy variable that equals to one from the 
beginning of the year that the incumbent firm become privatized, and zero if the 
incumbent mobile operator had not been privatized. We define a privatized frim when 
more than 50% of its share belongs to private owners. One important point about the 
privatization dummy is it does not show the quality of privatization; it just indicate that 
whether the government sold major part the firm or not.  
Competition variables indicates the number of mobile operators which are not 
owned by the incumbent. We consider different dummy variables for each new 
competitor in the countries’ market.  
To investigate effect of existence of separate regulatory agency we define a 
dummy variable indicating presence of separate regulator inn each studied country. In 
our data set separate regulators are assumed as independent decision makers where 
they not directly under control of government. Again it is important to note that 
displaying independent regulator by the dummy variable is an oversimplification of 
regulation. For better assessment we need to know type of regulatory task that propose 
by each regulator.    
As an another telecommunication explanatory variable , following Li (2008) we 
use fixed-line penetration to consider for the supply factor that may affect mobile 
penetration and also The fixed-line penetration shows the infrastructure potential of 
the country and the capicity of mobile services supply. 
Our dataset include GDP per capita, national population and urban population 
ratio (the percentage of total population live in urban areas) as other exogenous control 
variables. We retract these macroeconomics and demographic variables from World 
Bank data set. Importantly, all variables, except for dummies, were converted to natural 
logarithmic form.  
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While there are lots of factors influencing the performance of privatization and 
competition, data constraints prevented us from being formally modeled therefore we 
should take this to account in any conclusion which we are reaching here. 
 
3.1 Variables Description  
The variables included to test the hypothesis of whether reforms have effect on mobile 
network penetration are: privatization dummy (ܲݎݒ௜௧), independent regulator dummy 
( ܫ݊݀݌௜௧), and their interaction term (݅ݐܿܫ݊ ௜ܲ௧). The interaction term is added to explore 
effects of regulation while privatization is taking place. In other words this term shows 
how regulation and privatization together correlate with mobile network performance. 
To have controls for some market dependent factors that may affect mobile 
penetration rate in the countries. Particularly, we include GDP per capita (ܩܦ݄ܲ݁ܽ݀௜௧), 
as a proxy for income level of individuals. Income level can affect the demand for 
telecommunication services in the countries. We also include fixed telephone 
subscriptions (per 100 people) ሺ݂݅ݔ݈݅݊݁௜௧ሻ to control for level of telecommunication 
infrastructure in the countries where it may have role in supply of mobile services. 
Here we assume that the countries with higher level of fixed line network have better 
infrastructure for mobile network expansion. However, as explained by Li (2008), the 
size of fixed line network may have positive or negative effect on mobile network 
expansion as it can be complements or substitutes for mobile network. 
We try to confront with the endogeneity problem (i.e. macro-characteristics of 
countries’ that affect the reform variables performance and mobile network expansion) 
by controlling for features of countries that may lead the governments to conduct the 
reform in telecommunications market in order to stabilize macroeconomics, financial 
or political situations in the country. This eliminate the exogenity of the privatization, 
to deal with this problem we use International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database, 
to define Political (ܲ݋݈_ݎ݅ݏ݇), Economic (ܧܿ݋_ݎ݅ݏ݇), Financial (݂݅݊_ݎ݅ݏ݇) Risk ratings 
of the countries. Each one of the variables is defined as average value of several related 
index. The indexes spans between 1 and 10 where 10 indicates the lowest and 1 
indicates the highest risk, respectively. Specifically, political risk is defined as average 
value of Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, Investment, Internal 
Conflict, Bureaucracy Quality, and Corruption indexes. Economic risk is made as 
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average value of indexes about Real GDP Growth, Annual Inflation Rate, Current 
Account as a Percentage of GDP, and Budget Balance as a percentage of GDP. 
Financial risk is defined as mean value of indexes include: Foreign Debt as a 
Percentage of GDP, Foreign Debt Services as a Percentage of Exports of Goods and 
Services, Current Account as a Percentage of Exports of Goods and Services, Net 
International Liquidity, and Exchange Rate Stability.  
We include national population (ܲ݋݌௜௧) to capture the national market size and 
time dummies used to control for technological progress and global business cycles 
that may impact the mobile network expansion. We also include control variable for 
measuring urbanization as a percentage of total population (ܷܾܲ݋݌௜௧), in the countries 
which may impact expansion of mobile network positively. It is logical to assume 
better mobile signal coverage, higher income level and life standards for individuals in 
urban areas, compare to rural areas, which may increase the possibility of using mobile 
services for them.  
For first checkup of the data table 4 gives us first insight about the relationship 
between mobile deployment variable and reform variables in our data set. Specifically, 
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficient between the variable indicators of 
privatization, existence of separate regulator and number of competitors in mobile 
market and variable measuring telecommunication performance outcome (Mobile 
penetration rate). The relationship between privatization and mobile deployment is 
positive. The results also suggest relatively strong positive correlation between number 
of competitors in mobile providers market and penetration of mobile. Generating an 
independent regulator also positively correlate with mobile deployment. In the 
following section, we are going to investigate these relationships in our data set using 
econometric models.  
 
Table 2 
Correlation coefficients between privatization, competition  
and separate regulator with mobile penetration 
 Privatization No-Competitors Existence of Separate Regulator 
ln_mobile_subscription 0.1348 0.5924 0.4094 
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CHAPTER 4 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
e start our analysis with estimation of a simple OLS model. The Model 
(1) includes the privatization, and existence of an Independent 
regulator dummy variables. It also includes a set of dummies that 
indicate each new competitors in the countries mobile provides market.  For example 
ܦଶሺܿ݋݉݌ሻ௜௧ equals to one if a second mobile network competitors enters a market, and 
equals zero otherwise and so on.  
As mentioned, in the model (1) we add all the three dimensions of 
telecommunication reform (ܲݎݒ௜௧, ሺܿ݋݉݌ሻ௜௧, ܫ݊݀݌௜௧) along with interaction term of 
privatization and separate regulator (݅ݐܿܫ݊ ௜ܲ௧) to see how regulation and privatization 
jointly correlate with mobile penetration. We include our control variables for demand 
(݈ܷܾ݊ܲ݋݌௜௧, ݈݊ܩܦ݄ܲ݁ܽ݀௜௧ሻ and supply side (݈݂݊݅ݔ݈݅݊݁௜௧ሻ	of the market which may 
have effect on the mobile penetration rate in the sample countries. Importantly we 
control for time fixed effect ሺܶሻ which is time effect dummies to consider the effect of 
technology progress and global economy cycles during the sample period. 
 
݈݊	ݕ௜௧ ൌ 				ߙଵ௜ ൅ ߚଵଵܲݎݒ௜௧ 	൅ 	ߚଵଶܦ௝ሺܿ݋݉݌ሻ௜௧ ൅ ߚଵଷܫ݊݀݌௜௧ ൅ ߚଵସ݅ݐܿܫ݊ ௜ܲ௧
൅ ߚଵହ݈݊ܩܦ݄ܲ݁ܽ݀௜௧ ൅	ߚଵ଺݈݂݊݅ݔ݈݅݊݁௜௧ ൅ 	ߚଵ଻݈ܷܾ݊ܲ݋݌௜௧											ሺ1ሻ 								
൅ 		ߚଵ	ଵଵܶ ൅ ߝ௜௧																																																																														 
 
Afterwards, we estimate a fixed-effect model by including fixed effect of 
countries in our first model. With the help of fixed effect models we can control 
unobserved heterogeneity fixed effects. Because of this point fixed-effect models are 
preferred to random models in estimation of relationships between telecom reform 
variables and telecommunication performance outcomes. Also, we run a Hausman test 
and the results reject the null hypothesis which tells: random effect is appropriate. The 
model (2) defines as: 
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݈݊	ݕ௜௧ ൌ 				ߙଶ௜ ൅ ߚଶଵܲݎݒ௜௧ 	൅ 	ߚଶଶܦ௝ሺܿ݋݉݌ሻ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶଷܫ݊݀݌௜௧ ൅ ߚଶସ݅ݐܿܫ݊ ௜ܲ௧  
																											൅	ߚଶହ݈݊ܩܦ݄ܲ݁ܽ݀௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ଺݈݂݊݅ݔ݈݅݊݁௜௧ 	൅ 	ߚଶ଻݈ܷܾ݊ܲ݋݌௜௧												ሺ2ሻ  
                        ൅			ߚଶ଼ܶ ൅ ݑ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧																																																																																					 
 
Model (3) is again a fixed-effect model where we add three macroeconomic risk 
variable to control for political, economic and financial risk of countries which may 
have some effect on our dependent variable or they may indirectly affect our 
telecommunication reform variables. The result is presented in third column of table 4. 
 
݈݊	ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙଷ௜ 				൅ ߚଷଵܲݎݒ௜௧ 	൅ 	ߚଷଶܦ௝ሺܿ݋݉݌ሻ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷଷܫ݊݀݌௜௧ ൅ 	ߚଷହ݈݊ܩܦ݄ܲ݁ܽ݀௜௧
൅ ߚଷ଺݈݂݊݅ݔ݈݅݊݁௜௧ ൅ 	ߚଷ଻݈ܷܾ݊ܲ݋݌௜௧	 ൅ 	ߚଷ଼݂݅݊௥௜௦௞ ൅ 	ߚଷଽܧܿ݋௥௜௦௞
൅ ߚଷ	ଵ଴ܲ݋݈௥௜௦௞ ൅ ߚଷ	ଵଵܶ ൅ ݑ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧																																																ሺ3ሻ 
 
Besides the points against random effect assumption in our analysis, For further 
examination about the robustness of fixed effect assumption,  in model (4) which is 
exactly same as model (3) we run a random effect model to estimate the relationships. 
The random-effect model, assumes that any characteristic of a country that would not 
vary during the time of our sample and would not accounted for in the estimation (e.g. 
religion, geography, location with respect to equator) would may make some bias in 
the result.  
 
݈݊	ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙସ௜ 				൅ ߚସଵܲݎݒ௜௧ 	൅ 	ߚସଶܦ௝ሺܿ݋݉݌ሻ௜௧ ൅ ߚସଷܫ݊݀݌௜௧ ൅ 	ߚସହ݈݊ܩܦ݄ܲ݁ܽ݀௜௧
൅ ߚସ଺݈݂݊݅ݔ݈݅݊݁௜௧ ൅ 	ߚସ଻݈ܷܾ݊ܲ݋݌௜௧	 ൅ 	ߚସ଼݂݅݊௥௜௦௞ ൅ 	ߚସଽܧܿ݋௥௜௦௞
൅ ߚସ	ଵ଴ܲ݋݈௥௜௦௞ 					൅ ߚସ	ଵଵܶ ൅ ݑ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧																																											ሺ4ሻ 
        
As other sensitivity checks for our main model, instead of political risk indicator 
in model (3) we control for bureaucracy quality in model (5) and corruption level in 
model (6). In Model (7) we add interaction term of independent regulator and 
15 
 
bureaucracy quality as a control variable. Model (8) controls for interaction of 
independent regulator and corruption level. 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 We also intended to control for “the rule of law” index which indicate whether legal institutions protect 
competitors rights, but this index is not available for all years of our study. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
able 5 reports results of estimated models. The results are, in general, 
consistent with findings of the existing literature. As mentioned earlier, first 
column of table 5, reports the estimation result for an OLS model. The result 
suggest, holding other factors constant, privatization per se, regulatory reform per se, 
and their interaction term had positive but not significant impacts on mobile 
penetration. The results indicate that although privatization and existence of separate 
regulator has positive effect on mobile network penetration, their effect increase when 
they come together.  As expected introducing new competitors are associated with 
improvement in mobile network expansion where generally seems increasing the 
competing level in the market is correlated with higher mobile penetration rate.  
Second column of the Table 5 presents Model (2) results. The results suggest 
controlling for countries fixed effect improved the results. As it is shown Privatization 
and existence of separate regulator per se, are again positively correlated with the 
dependent variables where privatization coefficient in this model become significant 
in 90 percent confidence interval.  The effect of privatization along with existence of 
separate regulator shows higher and this time statistically significant associated with 
mobile network penetration in the studied countries during the studied period. The 
coefficients of competitors show positive and statistically significant pattern for 
correlation of introducing new competitors and the telecommunication market 
outcome variable.  
Third column of table 5 reports estimation result of Model (3) results. We can 
see by controlling for the risk factors of reform variables become larger and generally 
their significance level increase. Consistence with previous models result again shows 
privatization and separate regulator are positively correlated with the dependent 
variable. Their interaction term shows their simultaneous effect are higher than 
individual effect. This can interpret to better performance of privatized company in 
presence of separate regulator. The coefficients of new competitors show positive and 
statistically significant effect on mobile penetration rate.  The increasing pattern of new 
competitors’ coefficients suggest effectiveness of higher competition level on 
T 
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telecommunication performance. The explanation for the positive effect of competition 
on the mobile penetration may because increasing the competition between mobile 
operators decrease the price of services and this will raise the demand for mobile 
services. 
Fourth column of table 5 presents result for random effect model. The model 
results are generally consistent with fixed effect model results in third column. This 
suggest that the estimation result of our preferred specification (model 3), is not 
sensitive to fixed effect assumption. 
Besides our interested variables the conducted econometric analysis suggests 
positive and statistically significant value for fixed-line penetration coefficient in 
model (1) and (2), while positive but not significant value in model (3). GDP per capita, 
our proxy variable for income level in each country, as expected is positively correlated 
with mobile penetration but it’s relationship is statically significant only in model(1). 
Urban population ratio is also show positive correlation with mobile penetration rate. 
Finally, table 7 and 8 displays results for the robustness checks. As it is shown in table 
7 controlling for level of corruption does not change our main findings regarding 
importance of competition level and privatization on mobile expansion rate in studied 
developing countries. Table 8 shows that considering countries bureaucracy quality or 
corruption levels in the time of establishing separate regulator also do not affect 
aforementioned findings.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
n this study, we conduct an econometric analysis for investigating the effects of 
privatization, competition and existence of an independent regulator on mobile 
penetration for panel dataset of 46 countries during 1995-2016. First we run a 
simple OLS model, and then we proceed by including fixed effect of countries in model 
(2), in the third model, which can consider as our preferred specification we have 
developed our fixed-effect model by including three macroeconomic risk variable to 
control for political, economic and financial risk of countries which may have 
simultaneous effect on reform variables and mobile network penetration rate. The 
results also examine by some robustness checks, where they support our main findings 
in the preferred specification. 
Consistent with previous studies (Li, 2008) the results implies that competition 
is obviously associated with the increase in mobile penetration rate. The increasing 
pattern in coefficients of new competitors’ dummies suggest importance of 
competition level in telecommunication outcomes. We find positively significant 
relationship of privatization and interaction of privatization with independent regulator 
with mobile deployment in our preferred model. The results suggest positive but not 
significant relation between existing an independent regulator with mobile 
deployment. This can be because of weak enforcement and design in the planning and 
execution of rules and policies.  
Despite its shortcomings our work, has demonstrated that reforms in developing 
countries seems to be in the right track: encouraging competition and emphasizing on 
existence of independent regulatory when privatizing an incumbent telecom provider. 
However, the results still are far from conclusive and further studies are essential to 
address the main issues. In the future as quality and quantity of available data improve 
econometrics studies become more consistent and they provide deeper insights about 
the issues.  
Future work can contribute to the literature by gathering data to address the issues 
such as; how privatization took place, type of regulation that enforced on privatized 
I 
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firm and whether readjustment in prices happen before privatization, these information 
may help explain the results obtained in this paper or conclude different results. 
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APPENDIX (I)  
DYNAMIC MODEL 
 
o further assessment of the impact of existing separate regulator, 
privatization and level of liberalization on mobile penetration rate within 
GSM providers market, we consider to study the short run effect of 
telecommunication reform variables in dynamic framework. Following Gutierrez 
(2003) we define a simple dynamic model by adding one period lagged dependent 
variable as new explanatory variable to the model (3). Hence, the dynamic model 
define as: 
 
݈݊	ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙହ௜					 ൅ 	݈݊	ݕ௜௧ିଵ	 ൅ 	ߚହଵܦ௝ሺܿ݋݉݌ሻ௜௧ ൅ ߚହଶܲݎݒ௜௧ 	൅ ߚହଷܫ݊݀݌௜௧
൅ ߚହସ݅ݐܿܫ݊ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߚହହ݈݊ܩܦ݄ܲ݁ܽ݀௜௧ ൅ ߚହ଺݈݊ܲ݋݌௜௧ ൅ ߚହ଻݈ܷܾ݊ܲ݋݌௜௧
൅ ߚହ଼	݂݅݊௥௜௦௞ ൅ ߚହଽܧܿ݋௥௜௦௞ ൅ ߚହ	ଵ଴ܲ݋݈௥௜௦௞ ൅ ߚହ	ଵଵܶ ൅ ݑ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧							ሺ5ሻ 
 
We estimate the dynamic model using system GMM estimators method proposed 
by Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998). We conduct the dynamic panel 
estimation using xtabond2 command in STATA software. The results for dynamic 
model reports in table 6 (presented in appendix II). The second Column of table 6 
report long run effect of the telecommunication reform variables. 
The results presents positive correlation between existence of separate regulator, 
and privatization, and their interaction with mobile penetration growth rate in short 
run. We find positive association between new competitors dummy and the dependent 
variable even in short run where it become statistically significant by introducing 
fourth competitors.  This suggest higher effectiveness of competition even in short run. 
It is important to note that, the result of dynamic model is not directly comparable 
with pervious models’ results. Since in dynamic models we are analyzing the effect of 
the reforms variable on growth of mobile penetration in a short run.  
T 
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APPENDIX (II)  
TABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3a 
Summary statistics for telecom independent variables
Mena South Asia
Country 
Year 
independent 
regulator 
established 
Year 
incumbent 
privatized 
Number 
mobile 
competitors 
by 2016 
Country 
Year 
independent 
regulator 
established 
Year 
incumbent 
privatized 
Number 
mobile 
competitors 
by 2016 
Algeria 2001 N 3 Sri Lanka 1996 1995 5
Egypt 2003 1998 3 Malaysia 1998 1995 4 
Iran 2003 N 4 Indonesia 2003 1995 5 
Morocco 1997 N 2 Thailand 2010 N 4
Tunisia 2001 2005 3 China 2012 N 3 
Lebanon 2007 1995 2 Pakistan 1996 1995 4 
Jordan 1995 1995 3 India 1997 1995 5
Yemen N 1995 4 Bangladesh 2002 1997 4 
Oman 2002 N 2 Philippines 1995 1995 2
Kuwait 2015 1995 3   
Saudi Arabia 2001 N 5 
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Table 3b 
Summary statistics for telecom independent variables 
                            Latin  America                                                                   Sub Saharan Africa
Country 
Year 
independent 
regulator 
established 
Year 
incumbent 
privatized 
Number 
mobile 
competitors 
by 2016 
Country 
Year 
independent 
regulator 
established 
Year 
incumbent 
privatized 
Number 
mobile 
competitors 
by 2016 
Argentina 2015 1995 4 Angola 1999 2001 2
Brazil 1997 1995 4 Gabon 2001 2007 3 
Bolivia 1995 1995 3 Namibia 2011 N 2
Costa Rica 2008 2005 3 Mauritius 2002 1995 3 
Colombia 1995 1995 4 South Africa 2000 1995 4 
Dominican Rep. 1998 1998 4 Niger 2004 2001 4
Ecuador 1995 1995 3 Nigeria 1995 1995 6 
Guatemala 1996 1996 4 Senegal 2001 1997 3
Paraguay 1995 1999 4 Malawi 1998 1995 2 
Peru 1995 1995 4 Zambia 1995 N 3 
Uruguay 2001 N 3 Cameroon 1998 1998 3
Honduras 1995 1995 4 Uganda 1997 1995 6 
El Salvador 1996 1995 4   
Nicaragua 1995 1995 2   
Vietnam 2011 N 6 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics -  mean  by year 
 Mob_sub Fix_line Sep_reg Privet Eco_risk Fin_risk Pol_risk No_comp 
1995 0.646 5.46 0.239 0.5 1.588 1.863 1.655 0.391 
1996 1.036 5.977 0.326 0.522 1.643 1.855 1.665 0.435 
1997 1.726 6.653 0.413 0.565 1.796 1.87 1.686 0.522
1998 2.466 7.168 0.413 0.63 1.891 1.902 1.677 0.587 
1999 3.713 7.693 0.522 0.652 1.854 1.912 1.647 0.717 
2000 6.168 8.193 0.543 0.652 1.92 1.918 1.638 0.848 
2001 9.131 8.598 0.674 0.696 1.937 1.946 1.664 1.065
2002 12.392 8.887 0.717 0.696 1.91 1.925 1.634 1.174 
2003 15.709 9.261 0.783 0.696 1.917 1.945 1.634 1.239 
2004 21.551 9.794 0.804 0.696 1.95 1.991 1.652 1.522 
2005 30.649 10.213 0.804 0.739 1.975 2.024 1.656 1.717
2006 41.405 10.412 0.804 0.739 1.995 2.042 1.658 1.783 
2007 54.462 10.795 0.826 0.761 2 2.06 1.652 1.935 
2008 66.886 11.071 0.848 0.739 1.991 2.066 1.644 2.109 
2009 78.111 11.114 0.848 0.739 1.906 2.067 1.644 2.217
2010 87.742 10.67 0.87 0.739 1.925 2.098 1.638 2.391 
2011 96.735 10.436 0.913 0.739 1.95 2.11 1.61 2.435 
2012 102.149 10.304 0.935 0.739 1.94 2.096 1.599 2.457 
2013 108.15 9.833 0.935 0.739 1.941 2.095 1.594 2.457
2014 110.179 9.394 0.957 0.739 1.946 2.086 1.592 2.565 
2015 109.228 9.224 0.978 0.739 1.931 2.057 1.594 2.543 
2016 109.297 9.291 0.978 0.739 1.888 2.05 1.596 2.543 
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Table 5 
Regression results -Dependent variable mobile cellular subscriptions  
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
Independent 
regulator 
0.0898  
(0.2444)  
0.1324  
(0.2687)  
0.3300       
(0.2330)  
 0.3231  
(0.2317) 
Privatization 0.2546 (0.2931)  
 0.9533* 
(0.4552)  
 1.0130*     
(0.4424)  
  0.7760*     
(0.3534)  
Interaction 
Ind-prev 
0.3996 
(0.2451)  
0.9618* 
(0.4560)  
 1.0861*  
(0.4508)   
  0.8662**    
(0.3353) 
1.no_comp   0.5071* (0.2302) 
0.5382* 
(0.2310) 
  0.4695*      
(0.2048)     
 
 0.4070    
(0.2177)   
2.no_comp  0.5101* (0.2285) 
 0.7827** 
(0.2735) 
0.6862** 
(0.2398) 
  0.5622*    
(0.2467)  
3.no_comp  0.4657 (0.2516) 
0.8776* 
(0.3613) 
0.8378** 
(0.3090) 
 0.6251*   
(0.2778)  
4.no_comp 0.6434* (0.2925) 
1.3346* 
(0.5193) 
 1.4127** 
(0.4578) 
  1.2240** 
(0.3875)  
5.no_comp 1.3603*** (0.3095) 
 1.8367* 
(0.7494) 
 1.7625* 
(0.6768) 
 1.7752***   
(0.5117) 
 
ln_fix_line 0.3488*** (0.0739)  
0.3449* 
(0.1613)  
0.2488    
(0.1386)  
0.2273*    
(0.0972) 
ln_urb_pop 0.3441 (0.2077)  
0.7359 
(1.6431)  
0.7192     
(1.4740)  
0.4096   
(0.2700) 
ln_gdp_head 0.3069* (0.1221)  
1.3001  
(0.7251)  
1.1103    
(0.6532)  
0.3584    
(0.2060)     
pol_risk No  No  Controlled   Controlled 
fin_risk No  No  Controlled   Controlled 
eco_risk No  No  Controlled   Controlled 
R2 within 0.8932 0.9199 0.9293  0.9259  
N 1012  1012 1012  1012 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Model (1) is simple OLS Model. Model (2) is Fixed effect model, Model (3) is fixed-
effect model including three macroeconomic risk variable, and Model (4) is 
Random effect model. 
***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%
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Table 6 
Dynamic model estimation results  
 
 Short run  Long run 
Lag ln_mob_sub 0.8785*** (0.0202)   
Independent regulator 0.0551 (0.0670)  0.4535 
Privatization 0.0777 (0.0927)  0.6395 
Interaction Ind-priv 0.0357 (0.0675)  0.2938 
1.no_comp 0.1273 (0.0725) 1.0477 
2.no_comp 0.1260 (0.0815) 1.0370 
3.no_comp 0.1393 (0.0753) 1.1465 
4.no_comp 0.1914*  (0.0757) 1.5753 
5.no_comp 0.1477 (0.0826) 1.2156   
ln_fix_line -0.0012 (0.0128)   
ln_urb_pop 0.0708 (0.0432)   
ln_gdp_head -0.0208 (0.0304)   
  
pol_risk Controlled  
fin_risk Controlled  
eco_risk Controlled  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.002  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.480  
Hansen test of overid. 0.247  
Exogenity 0.106  
Number of instruments 44  
N 966
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
The long-run effects are calculated by dividing short run coefficients to convergence 
rate (1- 0.8785). 
***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10% 
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Table 7.  Robustness check results (I) 
    Model (3)   Model (5)  Model (6)        
Independent 
regulator 
 
0.3300 
 (0.2330) 
0.3444 
(0.2383) 
0.2995 
(0.2414)   
Privatization 
  1.0130* 
(0.4424)  
1.0768* 
(0.4436)  
1.0370* 
(0.4149)   
Interaction      
Ind-priv 
 1.0861* 
(0.4508) 
1.1438* 
(0.4510) 
1.0470* 
(0.4252)  
1.no_comp  
 
0.4695* 
(0.2048)  
0.4742* 
(0.2046) 
0.4747* 
(0.2010)   
2.no_comp 
  0.6862** 
(0.2398)   
0.6980** 
(0.2381)  
0.6620** 
(0.2356)    
3.no_comp 
 0.8378** 
(0.3090) 
0.8590** 
(0.3019) 
0.8034** 
(0.2985)  
4.no_comp 
 1.4127** 
(0.4578) 
1.4761** 
(0.4568) 
1.3393** 
(0.4733)   
5.no_comp 
 1.7625* 
(0.6768)  
1.7961* 
(0.6818) 
1.7198* 
(0.6799)  
ln_fix_line 
 0.2488 
(0.1386) 
0.2519 
(0.1381) 
0.275 
 (0.1402)  
ln_urb_pop 
 0.7192 
(1.4740) 
0.7568 
(1.4942) 
0.6862 
(1.4598)  
ln_gdp_head 
 1.1103 
(0.6532) 
1.0789 
(0.6541) 
1.0795 
(0.6486)  
Bureaucracy  ̶ Controlled ̶ 
Corruption  ̶ ̶ Controlled 
pol_risk  Controlled ̶ ̶ 
fin_risk  Controlled Controlled Controlled 
eco_risk  Controlled Controlled Controlled 
R2 within  0.9293 0.9295 0.9303 
N  1012 1012 1012 
Model (3): Main model, Model (5): Fixed effect model control for bureaucracy 
quality instead of political risk. Model (6): Fixed effect model control for corruption 
instead of political risk. 
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Table 8.  Robustness check  results  (II) 
    Model (3)   Model (7)   Model (8)         
Independent 
regulator  
0.3300  
(0.2330) 
0.9909       
(0.7648)  
0.8818 
(0.5481) 
Privatization  1.0130* (0.4424)  
0.9850*      
(0.4177) 
1.0502* 
(0.4016)  
Interaction Ind-priv 1.0861* (0.4508) 
1.7038       
(0.8760) 
1.6331* 
(0.6795)  
1.no_comp  0.4695* (0.2048)  
0.4441*       
(0.2060)  
0.4608* 
(0.1988) 
2.no_comp  0.6862** (0.2398)   
0.6648**     
(0.2399) 
0.6657** 
(0.2285) 
3.no_comp 0.8378** (0.3090) 
0.8140**      
(0.2977)  
0.7823* 
(0.2958) 
4.no_comp 1.4127** (0.4578) 
1.4310**     
(0.4598) 
1.3318** 
(0.4781)  
5.no_comp 1.7625* (0.6768)  
1.7314*      
(0.6890) 
1.6878* 
(0.7026) 
ln_fix_line 0.2488 (0.1386) 
0.2562       
(0.1380) 
0.263 
(0.1423) 
ln_urb_pop 0.7192 (1.4740) 
0.8976       
(1.4514) 
1.0041 
(1.5125) 
ln_gdp_head 1.1103 (0.6532) 
1.0441       
(0.6555) 
1.0372 
(0.6759) 
int ind reg- 
corruption (0) ̶ ̶ 
0.2917 
(0.1550) 
int ind reg- 
corruption (1) ̶ ̶ 
 0.0476  
(0.1022) 
int ind reg- 
bureaucracy (0) ̶ 
0.3168        
(0.2515) ̶ 
int ind reg- 
bureaucracy (1) ̶ 
-0.0174      
(0.2329) ̶ 
pol_risk Controlled Controlled Controlled 
fin_risk Controlled Controlled Controlled 
eco_risk Controlled Controlled Controlled 
R2 within 0.9293 0.9300 0.9314 
N 1012 1012 1012 
Model (3):  Main model, Model (7): Fixed effect model with control for interaction 
of independent regulator and bureaucracy quality. Model (8): Fixed effect model 
control for interaction of independent regulator and corruption. 
